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Abstract
This paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose
validity is uncertain. Focusing rst on weak patents, i.e. patents that have a high probability
of being invalidated by a court if challenged, we show that the patent holder nds it optimal to
use a per-unit royalty contract if the strategic e¤ect of an increase in a potential licensees unit
cost on the equilibrium industry prot is positive. The latter condition ensures the superiority of
the per-unit royalty mechanism independently of whether the patent holder is an industry insider
or outsider, and is shown to hold in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous
(resp. di¤erentiated) products under general assumptions on the demands faced by rms. We
then examine the optimal licensing of patents that are uncertain but not necessarily weak. As a
byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by o¤ering some new insights
of independent interest regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution by Arrow (1962), analyzing the licensing contracts whereby patent
holders sell the right to use protected technologies has become an important topic in the economics of
innovation and technology di¤usion. Arrow compared the revenues that an outside innovator obtains
from licensing a cost-reducing innovation to a competitive industry and to a monopolistic industry.
He showed that when a per-unit royalty is charged, a perfectly competitive industry generates higher
licensing revenues than a monopolistic one.1 Subsequently, Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and
Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986) analyzed di¤erent licensing mechanisms (xed fee, auction and
per-unit royalty) when the potential licensees are members of an oligopoly. A key insight of the
theoretical literature that has built on those seminal papers is that the optimal licensing mechanism
depends on many factors, including the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation
between products and whether the patent holder is active or not in the downstream market.2 These
three factors have been shown to be critical in the sense that predictions regarding the optimal
mechanism can be completely overturned by varying any of them.3
A common feature of the existing papers on the comparison of di¤erent licensing mechanisms
is that patents are viewed as certain or ironclad rights, the validity of which is unquestionable.
This clearly contradicts what we observe in practice: about half of the patents that are challenged
before US courts are invalidated (Allison & Lemley, 1998).4 It is now largely recognized that a
patent is not a perfectly enforceable right, as are other forms of property. Patents correspond much
more to "uncertain or probabilistic rights because they only give a limited right to try to exclude
by asserting the patent in court" (Ayres and Klemperer, 1999; Shapiro, 2003; Lemley and Shapiro,
2005). Moreover, this uncertainty is strengthened by the fact that many applications are granted
patent protection by the patent o¢ce (PO) even though they probably do not meet one or several
of the statutory requirements: belonging to the patentable subject matters, utility, novelty and non-
obviousness (or inventiveness). Such patents are weak in the sense that they have a high probabilty
of being invalidated by a court if challenged by a third party.5
1This is a consequence of the well known replacement e¤ect, according to which the willingness to pay for an
innovation is larger for an entrant in a competitive industry than for an incumbent rm.
2Empirically, royalties seem to be more often used than xed fees (Taylor and Silberstone, 1973; Rostoker, 1984).
However, available data on patent licensing is very limited, because most rms elect not to disclose their private
licensing contracts. Most empirical investigations emphasize the factors that a¤ect the likelihood of rms to engage in
licensing agreements but are less informative on the licensing scheme (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Vonortas and Kim,
2004, Zuniga and Guellec, 2009 )
3For instance, it has been shown that under Cournot competition with homogeneous products, xed fees dominate
per-unit royalties when the licensor is an industry outsider (Kamien and Tauman, 1984, 1986; Kamien et al., 1992).
However, the reverse result holds if the licensor is an industry insider (Shapiro, 1985; Wang, 1998; Kamien and Tauman,
2002; Sen, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2007, 2012). Furthermore, under price competition with di¤erentiated products,
per-unit royalties dominate xed fees when the products are close substitutes or, if not, when the size of the cost
reduction is small, while the reverse holds if the products are weak substitutes and the innovation is large (Muto,
1993). The results are quite di¤erent if one considers the same di¤erentiated product environment but assumes that
rms compete in quantities instead of prices (Wang, 2002).
4This concerns the patent disputes that are not settled prior to the court judgement.
5The notion of "weak patent" has at least two di¤erent meanings in the literature (Ginarte and Park, 1997, van
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The proliferation of uncertain patents can be explained by several reasons. First, the major patent
o¢ces (USPTO, EPO and JPO) have insu¢cient resources to ensure an e¤ective review process for
the huge and growing number of patent applications (Friebel et al., 2006). Second, mistakes are
unavoidable because the patentability requirements, in particular novelty and non-obviousness, are
di¢cult to assess especially for newly patentable subject matters, such as software, business methods
and research tools. Third, the incentives provided to the examiners are inadequate for making them
fully prosecute and reject the applications that do not meet the standards (Farrell and Merges, 2004;
Langinier and Marcoul, 2009; Lei and Wright, 2010). Finally, the continuing debate on what subject
matters are patentable throws additional uncertainty into the validity of many patents (Guellec and
van Pottelsberghe, 2007).
In this paper we investigate the optimal licensing mechanism from the perspective of a licensor
holding an uncertain patent and facing the threat of patent litigation. We thus extend three strands
of literature:
1. The vast literature that compares various licensing mechanisms in the context of ironclad
patents.6 Our contribution is to extend this comparison to patents whose validity is uncertain.
We believe that such an extension is warranted in light of the growing proliferation of uncertain
patents and, in particular, weak ones.7 We thus investigate rst the case of weak patents and pro-
vide a su¢cient condition under which the holders of such patents prefer to charge a per unit royalty
rather than a xed fee.8 This condition has a very natural economic interpretation: it states that
the strategic e¤ect of an increase in an oligopolists unit cost on industry prots is positive. This
result is very general since the type of competition between the potential users of the technology is
not specied in our model except for assuming the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
to the competition game and some properties that are shown to be broadly satised in usual im-
perfect competition models. Then we show that the su¢cient condition above holds and, therefore
the per-unit royalty mechanism is optimal from the patent holders perspective, in a wide range of
settings.9 A key di¤erence with the literature considering ironclad patents is that the superiority
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2010). First, a patent can be said to be weak if it gives its holder a low protection against
imitators and other potential infringers, either because the patents scope is badly dened or because the protection
extends to countries in which the enforcement of intellectual property rights is low. Second, a patent can be qualied as
weak when it is likely that it does not satisfy at least one of the patentability requirements (patentable subject matter,
utility, novelty, non obviousness or inventiveness in the European terminology). In this sense, a weak patent is likely to
be invalidated by a court if challenged by a third party. The present paper focuses on the latter meaning.
6See Bhattacharya et al. (2012) for a recent survey on the licensing of ironclad patents and other R&D arrangements.
7Bessen and Meurer (2008) argue that the inclusion of software and business methods in the patentable subject
matters in the US has resulted in an increase in the share of weak patents among all the patents issued by the USPTO.
8This condition is shown to be also su¢cient for the optimal two-part tari¤ contract to be a (pure) per-unit royalty
contract.
9This is a novel justication, based on the uncertainty over patent validity, for the use of per-unit royalties instead of
xed fees in licensing. Various other reasons have been explored in the literature on ironclad rights, including risk aver-
sion (Bousquet et al., 1998), asymmetry of information (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo,
1991; Beggs, 1992; Sen 2005a), moral hazard (Macho-Stadler et al., 1996; Choi, 2001), production di¤erentiation (Muto,
1993; Wang and Yang, 1999; Caballero-Sanz et al., 2002; Poddar and Sinha, 2004; Stamatopoulos and Tauman, 2007),
strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002), integer nature of the number of licensees (Sen, 2005b), variation in the quality of
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of per-unit royalties for the licensing of weak patents is a very robust result: it is independent of
the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation between products and whether
the patent holder is active or not in the downstream market. We then extend our analysis to the
licensing of patents that are uncertain, but not necessarily weak, and show that our nding about
the optimality of the per-unit royalty mechanism may hold even for patents that have a relatively
low probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged.
2. The burgeoning literature on the licensing of uncertain patents (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008;
Encaoua and Lefouili, 2005, 2009; Choi 2010). This literature has been mostly concerned with the
ine¢ciencies stemming from the low private incentives to litigate a weak patent. The social harm of
weak patents also depends on how they are licensed out and, therefore, we argue that it is crucial
to get a better understanding of the licensing schemes the holders of those problematic patents use.
In Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), the licensor is assumed to o¤er two-
part tari¤ licensing contracts. However, when considering the e¤ects of the uncertainty over patent
validity on the licensors prots and/or social welfare when negative xed fees cannot be used, each of
these two papers relies on a technical ad hoc assumption on the shape of the (endogenous) licensing
revenue function10 that substantially simplies the analysis by immediately guaranteeing that pure
per-unit royalty contracts are optimal for the licensors of weak patents in the class of contracts
deterring litigation. In sharp contrast to the former papers, our result that the holder of a weak
patent nds it optimal to use a per-unit licensing contract is implied by a mild condition which has
a natural economic interpretation and is shown to hold with broad generality in standard oligopoly
models with general demand functions (as are all the assumptions made in our model). This nding
is therefore arguably robust, especially as it is shown to hold as well in various extensions of our
baseline model. Furthermore, we show that a social planner always prefers the license of an uncertain
patent deterring litigation to take the form of a xed fee contract, which implies that the holder of a
weak patent chooses a socially suboptimal licensing mechanism. A policy implication is that welfare
gains may be realized by encouraging or constraining the holders of weak patents to license them by
means of xed fees.
3. The extensive literature on oligopoly. We contribute to this literature by providing new insights
regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on oligopolists prots (Seade, 1985; Kimmel, 1992; Février
and Linnemer, 2004). Since our result that the licensor of a weak patent nds it optimal to use a
per-unit royalty contract, holds whenever the strategic e¤ect of a unilateral cost increase on industry
prots is positive, we examine the latter condition and show that it holds (i) for Cournot competi-
tion with homogeneous products under complete generality, and (ii) for Bertrand competition with
di¤erentiated products under strategic complementarity. In other words, no restrictions on the de-
mand systems are needed beyond those commonly invoked to establish existence and uniqueness of
innovation (Rockett, 1990).
10Farrell and Shapiro (2008) assume that the licensing revenue function where the xed fee is set to its optimal level
(for a given per-unit royalty) is single-peaked in the per-unit royalty while Encaoua and Lefouili (2009) assume that
the same function is concave in the per-unit royalty (see assumption A6 in their paper).
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a pure-strategy equilibrium. An ancillary result is that we provide a lower bound on the e¤ect of a
unilateral cost increase on industry prots.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 char-
acterizes the optimal per-unit royalty (resp. xed fee) license from the patent holders perspective.
In Section 4 we compare the two licensing mechanisms for weak patents. In Section 5, we extend the
analysis by successively (i) including (small) litigation costs, (ii) allowing the patent holder to o¤er
two-part tari¤ licensing contracts, and (iii) considering a patent holder that is an industry insider. In
Section 6, we show that the general assumptions made on the equilibrium prots in our reduced-form
model of competition and the (su¢cient) condition under which the per-unit royalty mechanism is
optimal to the patent holder (be it an industry outsider or an insider) hold under general condi-
tions on the demand functions for both a Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods and a Bertrand
oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods. In Section 7, we extend our analysis to uncertain patents of any
strength. Welfare implications are discussed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an industry consisting of n  2 symmetric risk-neutral rms producing at a marginal
cost c (xed production costs are assumed to be zero). A rm P outside the industry holds a patent
covering a technology that, if used, allows a rm to reduce its marginal cost from c to c   F where
F 2]0; c[.
We consider the following three-stage game:
First stage: The patent holder P proposes to all rms a licensing contract11 whereby a licensee
can use the patented technology against the payment of a per-unit royalty r 2 [0; F] or a xed fee
F  0:12
Second stage: The n rms in the industry simultaneously and independently decide whether to
purchase a license. If a rm does not accept the license o¤er, it can challenge the patents validity
before a court.13 The outcome of such a trial is uncertain: with probability  > 0 the patent is upheld
by the court and with probability 1   it is invalidated. Hence, the parameter  may be interpreted
as the patents quality or the patents strength. If the patent is upheld, then a rm that does not
purchase the license uses the old technology, thus producing at marginal cost c whereas a rm that
accepted the license o¤er uses the new technology and pay the per-unit royalty r or the xed fee F
to the patent holder. If the patent is invalidated, all the rms, including those that accepted the
license o¤er can use for free the new technology and their common marginal cost is c  F.
11Following Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), we focus on take-it-or-leave-it license o¤ers.
12 In Section 5.2, we show that allowing the patent holder to o¤er two-part tari¤ contracts does not a¤ect our central
result.
13For patents granted by the European Patent O¢ce (EPO), the timing is slightly di¤erent. Indeed, any patent
issued by the EPO can be opposed by a third party and the notice of opposition must be led in writing at the EPO
within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent.
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Third stage: The n rms produce under the cost structure inherited from the second stage. We
do not specify the type of competition that occurs. We only assume that there exists a unique
equilibrium of the competition game for any cost structure and we set some general assumptions
on the equilibrium prot functions.14 For this purpose, denote e(k; c) (respectively i(k; c)) the
equilibrium prot function, gross of any potential xed cost, e.g. a xed license fee, of a rm
producing with marginal cost c  c (respectively with marginal cost c) when k  n rms produce at
marginal cost c and the remaining n  k rms produce at the marginal cost c:
We now make the following general assumptions for any given n and k = 1; :::; n:
A1. The equilibrium prots of an e¢cient rm and an ine¢cient rm, i.e. e(k; c) and i(k; c)
respectively, are both continuously di¤erentiable in c over the subset of [0; c] in which i(k; c) > 0:
Furthermore, the output function c ! qe (n; c) when the n rms produce at marginal cost c is
continuously di¤erentiable and strictly positive over [0; c].
A2. If the rms are symmetric (in terms of e¢ciency), an identical increase in all rms marginal
costs leads to a decrease in each rms equilibrium prot: @
e
@c (n; c) < 0.
A3. An ine¢cient rms equilibrium prot is increasing in the e¢cient rms marginal cost: If
i(k; c) > 0 then @
i
@c (k; c) > 0 and if 
i(k; c) = 0 then i(k; c0) = 0 for any c0 < c:
A4. A rms prot is decreasing in the number of e¢cient rms in the industry: for any c < c and
any k < n it holds that e(k; c) > e(k + 1; c) and i(k; c)  i(k + 1; c):
A5. A rms prot increases as it moves from the subgroup of ine¢cient rms to the subgroup of
e¢cient rms: for any c < c and any k < n it holds that i(k; c) < e(k + 1; c):
As we shall argue in precise detail in Section 6, all these assumptions are satised with broad
generality in the standard oligopoly models with general demand functions. In particular, these
assumptions are clearly satised for instance for the widely used settings of Cournot competition
with homogeneous goods and linear demand and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated goods
and linear demands.
3 Licenses deterring litigation
If litigation occurs then, with probability , the patent is upheld by the court (thus becoming an
ironclad right) and, with probability 1  ; it is invalidated and the technology can be used for free
by all rms. Thus, if the patent holder expects its license o¤er to trigger litigation, it should make
an o¤er that maximizes its revenues should the patent be ruled valid by the court. The patent holder
would then essentially act as if the patent were ironclad, and the determination of the terms on which
the technology is patented under each licensing mechanism would amount to the analysis of licensing
o¤ers for ironclad patents, which has already been done extensively in the literature. We therefore
consider in what follows only the class of license o¤ers deterring litigation, for which the uncertainty
14A similar general approach was previously adopted by Reinganum (1982) in a strategic search model, and by Amir
and Wooders (2000), Boone (2001) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009) in di¤erent R&D models.
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over patent validity does matter. In doing so, we follow Farrell and Shapiro (2008) who also focus
on license o¤ers such that litigation is avoided because they aim to investigate the social costs of the
uncertainty over patent validity (which is resolved if litigation occurs).15
Since we look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the game in which litigation is deterred,
we start our analysis by determining, under each mechanism, the license o¤ers that do not induce
litigation at the second stage of the game.
3.1 Per-unit royalty mechanism
Let us rst examine a rms incentives to challenge the patents validity when the patent holder makes
a license o¤er involving the payment of a per-unit royalty r. A rm that decides not to purchase a
license is always (weakly) better o¤ challenging the patents validity: If no other rm challenges the
patents validity it gets a payo¤ i(n   1; c   F + r) + (1  )e(n; c   F) which is strictly greater
than the prot i(n  1; c  F+ r) it would get by not challenging the patent, and if some other rm
challenges the patents validity then it is indi¤erent between challenging and not. Thus, a situation
where one or more rms do not buy a license and no rm challenges the patents validity can never
be an equilibrium of the second stage subgame. It follows that a license o¤er deters litigation if and
only if it is accepted by all rms.
Assume that the patent holder makes a license o¤er (in the rst stage) involving the payment of
a per-unit royalty r < F: Let us show that in this case, any outcome with k  n  2 licensees cannot
be an equilibrium. We have already shown that a situation where not all rms buy a license and no
rm challenges the patent cannot be an equilibrium so we can focus on situations with k  n   2
licensees and at least one non-licensee challenging the patent. Any of the other n   k   1  1 non-
licensees has an incentive to unilaterally deviate by buying a license since it would get an expected
prot of e(k + 1; c   F + r) + (1  )e(n; c   F) instead of the strictly lower expected prot
i(k; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F) if it remains a non-licensee. Therefore, any equilibrium of the
second stage subgame involves at least n 1 rms if r < F. The latter result extends to the case r = F
if it is assumed, as will be the case from now on, that a rm which is indi¤erent between getting a
license and not buying a license purchases a license.
Let us now write the condition under which all rms accepting the license o¤er r is an equilibrium
of the second stage subgame. A rm anticipating that all other rms will purchase a license gets a
prot equal to e(n; c  F+ r) if it accepts the license o¤er. If it does not and challenges the patents
validity then with probability ; the patent is upheld by the court and the challenger gets a prot
equal to i(n   1; c   F + r) and, with probability 1   , the challenger gets a prot of e(n; c   F)
(and so do all other rms). Thus, a rm challenging the patents validity when all other rms accept
the license o¤er, gets an expected prot of i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F): Therefore, all
15Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the vast majority of patent disputes are settled using licensing agreements
before the court decides whether the patent is valid or not (Allison and Lemley, 1998 and Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).
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rms accepting the license o¤er is an equilibrium if and only if:
e(n; c  F+ r)  i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F): (1)
The next proposition characterizes the values of the per-unit royalty set by the licensor that
induce all rms to buy a license (thus deterring any litigation).
Proposition 1 Dene r () as the unique solution in r to the following equation:
e(n; c  F+ r) = i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F):
Then all rms accepting to pay a per-unit royalty r is an equilibrium if and and only if r  r () :
Moreover, this is the unique equilibrium of the second stage subgame when r  r () :
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2 Fixed fee mechanism
The previous observation that a license o¤er deters litigation if and only if it is accepted by all rms
remains true when the licensor uses a xed fee scheme. For a license o¤er involving the payment of
a xed fee F to be accepted by all rms, the following condition must hold:
e(n; c  F)  F  i(n  1; c  F) + (1  )e(n; c  F)
which can be rewritten as:
F  

e(n; c  F)  i(n  1; c  F)

: (2)
The next proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 1 for the xed fee mechanism.
Proposition 2 All rms accepting to pay the xed fee F to use the patented technology is an equilib-
rium if and only if F  F () = [e(n; c F) i(n 1; c F)]: Moreover, for su¢ciently weak patents,
i.e. for su¢ciently small values of , all rms accepting the license o¤er is the unique equilibrium
when 0  F  F ():
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 Optimal licensing of weak patents under each mechanism
The patent holders licensing revenues are given by nrqe (n; c  F) if a per-unit royalty contract
is used and by nF if the contract takes the form of a xed fee payment. The next proposition
characterizes the license that maximizes the patent holders revenues subject to the constraint that
no rm challenges the patents validity.
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Proposition 3 For su¢ciently weak patents, the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation
involves the payment of the royalty rate r = r () and the optimal xed fee license deterring litigation
is such that F = F ().
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Optimal licensing mechanism for weak patents
The licensing revenues from the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation are given by
~Pr () = nr () q
e(n; c  F+ r ())
and the licensing revenues from the optimal xed fee licensing contract deterring litigation are
~PF () = nFn () = n

e (n; c  F)  i (n  1; c  F)

which, combined with e(n; c  F+ r ()) = i(n  1; c  F+ r ()) + (1  )e(n; c  F), yields
~Pr ()  ~PF () = A() +B()
where
A() = n [e(n; c  F+ r ()) + r () qe(n; c  F+ r ())  e (n; c  F)]
and
B() =  n

i(n  1; c  F+ r ())  i (n  1; c  F)

:
The term A() is the di¤erence between the industry prots generated under the optimal per-unit
royalty contract and those under the optimal xed fee contract. The term B(), which is always
non-positive16, captures the fact that a potential licensees outside option (when all other rms
buy a license) is weakly higher under the per-unit royalty contract: in the event where the patent
is invalidated, a challenger gets the same prot e (n; c  F) under both mechanisms, but in the
event where the patent is upheld the challengers prot is weakly higher under the per-unit royalty
mechanism since i(n 1; c  F+ r ())  i(n 1; c  F) by A3. The latter implies that each licensee
gets a higher prot under the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation than under its
xed fee counterpart. A corollary of this observation is that a necessary condition for the optimal
per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation to be preferred over its xed fee counterpart by the
patent holder is that it generates (weakly) higher industry prots. It turns out that this condition,
16Two scenarios have to be distinguished according to whether the set

c0 > c  F; i(n  1; c0) = 0
	
is empty or not.
If it is then i(n   1; c   F + r()) > i(n   1; c   F) for any  > 0, and therefore B() > 0 for any  > 0: If it is not
then it is easily shown that there exists 0 > 0 such that 
i(n   1; c   F + r()) = i(n   1; c   F) = 0 for   0 and
i(n  1; c  F+ r()) > i(n  1; c  F) for  > 0 by A3. It then follows that B()  0 with the inequality being strict
if and only if  > 0.
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when taken as a strict inequality, is actually su¢cient when the patent is su¢ciently weak. The
reason for this is that B() is, at most, a second-order term for  su¢ciently small (since B(0) = 0
and B0(0) = 0) while A() is generally a rst-order term. Therefore, for  su¢ciently small, the sign
of ~Pr ()  ~PF () will be the same as A() whenever A
0(0) 6= 0. In words, the holder of a (su¢ciently)
weak patent will nd it optimal to choose the licensing mechanism that maximizes industry prots
under the constraint that all rms accept the license o¤er. The next proposition provides a su¢cient
condition for the per-unit royalty mechanism to be preferred over the xed fee mechanism by the
holder of a (su¢ciently) weak patent.
Proposition 4 For a su¢ciently weak patent, the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litiga-
tion provides higher licensing revenues than the optimal xed fee contract deterring litigation if
@e
@c
(n; c  F) >  qe(n; c  F): (3)
Moreover, the reverse holds if the reverse strict inequality is satised.
Proof. See Appendix.
Condition (3) means that the strategic e¤ect of an identical increase in the marginal cost of all
(symmetric) rms on the rms prots is positive.17 This interpretation results from the following
decomposition (where we use the generic variable c instead of c   F as the second argument of the
considered functions):
@e
@c
(n; c) =  qe(n; c)| {z }
direct effect
+ qe(n; c)
@pe
@c
(n; c) + (pe (n; c)  c)
@qe
@c
(n; c)| {z }
strategic effect
:
An increase in all rms marginal cost c a¤ects their equilibrium prots e (n; c) through two channels.
First, it yields an increase in each rms production costs (for a given output). Second, it entails an
adjustment of their outputs and/or prices. The rst e¤ect, captured by the term  qe(n; c); can be
interpreted as a direct e¤ect of a common cost increase on equilibrium prots while the second e¤ect,
captured by the term qe(n; c)@p
e
@c (n; c) + (p
e (n; c)  c) @q
e
@c (n; c), can be interpreted as the strategic
e¤ect of a cost increase on prots.18
To the best of our knowledge, Condition (3) has not been studied in the literature on the e¤ects of
cost variations on oligopolists prots which has mainly focused on the overall e¤ect of cost changes
on prots (e.g. Seade, 1985, Kimmel, 1992; Février and Linnemer 2004). In Section 6 we show
the mildness of this condition by establishing that it holds under general assumptions in two of the
17Another interpretation of this condition can be given in terms of the Lerner index. The condition holds i¤ the
Lerner index is below the ratio of the price and quantity elasticities with respect to marginal cost.
18This strategic e¤ect can be further split into a price e¤ect captured by the term qe(n; c) @p
e
@c
(n; c) and an output
e¤ect captured by the term (pe(n; c)  c) @q
e
@c
(n; c) : In usual models of competition, the latter is negative while the
former is positive. Therefore the strategic e¤ect is positive if the price e¤ect outweighs the output e¤ect.
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most usual competition models, namely Cournot competition with homogenous goods and Bertrand
competition with di¤erentiated goods.
5 Extensions
5.1 Litigation costs
Let us assume in this section that a rm that challenges the patents validity before a court has
to incur some legal costs C  0.19 It is straightforward that the higher those costs the higher the
licensing revenues the patent holder can extract from the licensees without triggering litigation. This
qualitative observation holds under both mechanism. However, we show in what follows that on the
quantitative side, the marginal e¤ect of litigation costs on the patent holders licensing revenues is
higher under the per-unit royalty mechanism than under the xed fee mechanism if condition (3)
holds. This implies that the result in Proposition 4 remains true - and is actually strenghtened - if
the model is extended to include (small) legal costs that any challenger must incur.
Suppose rst that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a per-unit
royalty r 2 [0; F[ . Note that the inclusion of legal costs in our setting does not a¤ect the fact that
the strategy "not buy a license and not challenge the patents validity" is always dominated by the
strategy "buy a license". Therefore, the only way a patent holder can deter litigation is to make a
license o¤er that is accepted by all rms. This will be the case if and only if
e(n; c  F+ r)  i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F)  C:
It is easily shown the latter constraint is met if and only if r  r(; C) where r(; C) is the solution
in r to the equation
e(n; c  F+ r) = i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F)  C
and that, for  and C su¢ciently small, the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation
involves the payment of the royalty r(; C) (i.e. the constraint is binding). Note also that r(; C) is
strictly increasing in both its arguments.
Suppose now that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a xed fee F:
Such a license o¤er is accepted by all rms if and only if
e(n; c  F)  F  i(n  1; c  F) + (1  )e(n; c  F)  C
19 If we consider the opposition procedure at the European Patent O¢ce (EPO) instead of litigation before a court,
the cost C can be interpreted as the administrative fee a challenger of a patent has to pay to the EPO for the patent
to be reexamined.
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and, therefore, the optimal xed fee license deterring litigation involves the payment of the fee
F (; C) = 

e(n; c  F)  i(n  1; c  F)

+ C:
Let us now compare the licensing revenues derived by the patent holder under the two mechanisms.
Under the optimal per-unit royalty contract, they are given by
~Pr (; C) = nr (; C) q
e(n; c  F+ r (; C))
and under the optimal xed fee contract, they are given by
~PF (; C) = nFn (; C) = n

e (n; c  F)  i (n  1; c  F)

+ nC:
Since ~Pr (0; 0) = ~PF (0; 0) ; a su¢cient condition for the existence of ~ > 0 and ~C > 0 such that the
inequality ~Pr (; C) > ~PF (; C) holds for any  < ~ and C < ~C is that
@ ~Pr
@
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@
(0; 0)
and
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0)
The former inequality has already been shown to be equivalent to condition (3). Surprisingly enough,
the latter inequality is equivalent to condition (3) too. Indeed,
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0) = n
and
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) = n
@r
@C
(0; 0) qe(n; c  F):
Di¤erentiating with respect to C the equation dening r (; C) at point (; C) = (0; 0) ; we get:
@r
@C (0; 0) =  
1
@e
@c
(n;c F)
: Thus,
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) =  
nqe(n; c  F)
@e
@c (n; c  F)
:
Hence
@ ~Pr
@C
(0; 0) >
@ ~PF
@C
(0; 0)()
@e
@c
(n; c  F) >  qe(n; c  F):
Therefore, the result in Proposition 4 is robust - and is actually strengthened - in the presence of
relatively small legal costs.
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5.2 Two-part tari¤ contracts
Assume in this section that the patent holder can o¤er a two-part tari¤ licensing contract involving
the payment of a xed fee F  0 and a per-unit royalty r  0. The optimal two-part tari¤ contract
~F () ; ~r ()

deterring litigation is a solution to the following maximization program
max
F0, r2[0;F]
n (F + rqe (n; c  F+ r))
s:t: e(n; c  F+ r)  F  i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F):
Since the objective function is increasing in F , the constraint has to be binding at the optimum.
Therefore, the optimal two-part tari¤ contract

~F () ; ~r ()

is such that ~F () = e(n; c F+~r ()) 
i(n  1; c  F+ ~r ())  (1  )e(n; c  F) and ~r () is a solution to
max
r2[0;F]

rqe (n; c  F+ r) + e(n; c  F+ r)  i(n  1; c  F+ r)  (1  )e(n; c  F)

s:t: e(n; c  F+ r)  i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F):
Note that the latter constraint could be rewritten as r  r (), and that ~F () = 0 if and only if
~r () = r (), i.e. the constraint is binding. The next proposition shows that our main nding,
i.e. that the holder of a su¢ciently weak patent nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract
whenever Condition (3) holds, extends to a setting where the larger set of two-part tari¤ contracts
is considered.
Proposition 5 For su¢ciently weak patents, the optimal two-part tari¤ licensing contract deterring
litigation is a pure per-unit royalty contract if:
@e
@c
(n; c  F) >  qe(n; c  F):
Proof. See Appendix.
5.3 Internal patentee
Let us consider the case where the patent holder is active in the (downstream) market. More
specically, we assume that one of the n rms operating in the market, say rm 1, gets a patent on
a technology that lowers the unit production cost from c to c  F:We assume that n  3 (as we want
to have at least two potential licensees).
Here again, we assume that there exists a unique equilibrium of the competition game for any
cost structure (with identical prots for rms producing at the same unit cost) and we set some
general assumptions on the equilibrium prot functions. We focus on industry cost structures that
can emerge following the licensing game, that is, situations in which: one rm - the patent holder
13
- produces at unit cost c   F, a number k  n   1 of rms - the licensees - produce at a unit cost
c 2 [c  F; c] and the remaining n  k rms - the non-licensees - produce at unit cost c:We denote by
p(k; c), l(k; c) and n(k; c) the equilibrium market prots of the patent holder, a licensee producing
at an e¤ective unit cost c and a non-licensee respectively.
Given the new environment we consider, we need to replace the assumptions A1-A5 made in our
baseline model with the following assumptions:
A1. The equilibrium prots p(k; c), l(k; c) and n(k; c) are continuously di¤erentiable in c over
[0; c] over the subset of [0; c] in which n(c; k) > 0: Furthermore, the function c ! ql (n; c) is
continuously di¤erentiable over the subset of [0; c] in which it is strictly positive.
A2. An identical increase in the costs of all rms but the patent holder decreases each one of those
rms equilibrium prot: @
l
@c (n  1; c) < 0.
A3. A non-licensees equilibrium prot is increasing in the licensees unit cost: If n(k; c) > 0 then
@n
@c (k; c) > 0 and if 
n(k; c) = 0 then n(k; c0) = 0 for any c0 < c:
A4. A rms market prot is decreasing in the number of licensees in the industry: for any c < c and
any k < n  1 it holds that p(k; c) > p(k+ 1; c); l(k; c) > l(k+ 1; c) and n(k; c)  n(k+ 1; c):
A5. A rms market prot increases as it moves from the subgroup of non-licensees to the subgroup
of licensees: for any c < c and any k < n  1 it holds that n(k; c) < l(k + 1; c):
The comparison of the innovators overall prot, i.e. the sum of its market prot and licensing
revenues, under the two licensing mechanisms,yields the following result:
Proposition 6 For su¢ciently weak patents, the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litiga-
tion generates higher overall prot for the patent holder than its xed fee counterpart if
@p
@c
(n  1; c  F) + (n  1)
@l
@c
(n  1; c  F) >   (n  1) ql(n; c  F): (4)
Moreover, the reverse holds if the reverse strict inequality is satised.
Proof. See Appendix.
To see how Condition (4) compares to its counterpart when the patent holder is not active on the
market, i.e. Condition (3), let us rewrite both of them with the same notations. For that purpose,
let us denote by  (c1; c2; :::; cn) the sum of all rms equilibrium market prots, i.e. the equilibrium
(downstream) industry prot, and qi (c1; c2; :::; cn) rm is output when each rm j = 1; 2; :::; n
produces at unit cost cj :
The su¢cient condition for a patent holder who is an industry outsider to prefer the per-unit
royalty mechanism for su¢ciently weak patents can be rewritten as (replacing c  F with the generic
variable c):
nX
i=1
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  
nX
i=1
qi (c; c; :::; c) : (5)
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The su¢cient condition for a patent holder who is an industry insider to prefer the per-unit
royalty mechanism for su¢ciently weak patents can be rewritten as (replacing again c   F by the
generic variable c, and denoting P the patent holder):
nX
i=1
i6=P
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  
nX
i=1
i6=P
qi (c; c; :::; c) : (6)
The two inequalities have very close interpertations: Condition (5) means that the strategic e¤ect of
an identical increase in all rms (common) unit cost on the industry prot is positive and Condition
(6) means that the strategic e¤ect of an increase in the costs of all rms but one on the industry
prots is positive (rms being equally e¢cient initially). Note also that both conditions are implied
by the following inequality when it holds for any i = 1; 2; :::; n :
@
@ci
(c; c; :::; c) >  qi (c; c; :::; c) : (7)
This condition means that when rms are equally e¢cient initially, the strategic e¤ect of an increase
in one rms unit cost on the aggregate prot is positive.
We show in the next section that Condition (7) holds (i) for Cournot competition with homo-
geneous products under complete generality, and (ii) for Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated
products under strategic complementarity, provided existence an uniqueness of a pure-strategy equi-
librium holds in these two environments. It then follows that both Condition (5) and Condition (6)
hold since they are implied by Condition (7).
6 Two standard oligopoly applications
In this section, we provide su¢cient conditions of a general nature on the primitives of the two most
widely used models of imperfect competition, which lead to Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-A5 and
Condition (7) being veried. Since some of the results below are new to the oligopoly literature,
and of some independent interest, we derive them for fully asymmetric versions of the Cournot and
Bertrand oligopolies with linear costs. Accordingly, we also change the notation as needed, relative
to the other parts of the paper.
6.1 Cournot competition with homogeneous products
Consider an industry consisting of n rms competing in Cournot fashion. Firm is marginal cost is
denoted ci (xed production costs are assumed to be zero or otherwise sunk). Suppose the rms face
an inverse demand function P () satisfying the following minimal conditions:
C1 P () is twice continuously di¤erentiable and P 0() < 0 whenever P () > 0:
C2 P (0) > ci > P (Q) for Q su¢ciently high, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
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C3 P 0(Q) +QP 00(Q) < 0 for all Q  0 with P () > 0.
These assumptions are quite standard. C3 is the familiar condition used by Novshek (1985) to
guarantee downward-sloping reaction curves (for any cost function). It is equivalent to the statement
that each rms marginal revenue is decreasing in rivals output (see Amir, 1996 for an alternative
condition).
Firm is prot function and reaction correspondence are (here, Q i =
P
j 6=i qj)
i(qi; Q i) = qi [P (qi +Q i)  ci] and ri(Q i) = argmax
qi0
i(qi; Q i):
The next proposition provides general conditions under which Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-A5
hold for a Cournot oligopoly.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions C1-C3, the following holds:
(a) There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium.
(b) Firm is equilibrium prot i is di¤erentiable in ci and in cj for any j 6= i:
(c) Firm is equilibrium prot i is decreasing in ci and increasing in cj for any j 6= i:
If in addition, the game is symmetric (with c denoting the unit cost), then
(d) The unique Cournot equilibrium is symmetric.
(e) The equilibrium output q strictly decreases in c.
(f) Per-rm equilibrium prot  decreases in c:
Proof. See Appendix.
It is straightforward to relate the di¤erent parts of Proposition 7 to Assumptions A1-A5 and
A1-A5. Part (a) is needed to avoid vacuous statements. Assumptions A1 and A1 are implied
by part (b) and the proof of part (e). Assumption A2 follows from part (f) and Assumption A2
follows from combining part (f) with part (c). Assumptions A3 and A3 are implied by part (c).
Assumptions A4 and A4 follow from repeated applications of part (c), with one rival rms cost
decreasing at a time. Assumptions A5 and A5 follow from part (c).
We now discuss the scope of these assumptions, focusing on parts (f) and (c), the other assump-
tions being well known for existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Though intuitive, part
(f) actually has a less universal scope than one might think. Indeed, there is an extensive literature
dealing with taxation in oligopolistic industries and one of its key insights is that a common cost
increase can lead to some rms beneting at the expense of others (Seade, 1985, Kimmel, 1992, and
Février and Linnemer, 2004). More surprisingly, in a symmetric setting, a cost increase may be
benecial to all rms, when the inverse demand function is su¢ciently convex. In light of this result,
part (f) may be viewed as giving su¢cient conditions for this counter-intuitive e¤ect of taxation not
to arise.
Since the cost paradox literature considers cost increases that are common to all rms, it does
not deal directly with the prot e¤ects of a unilateral cost change, as in the results of part (c).
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Nevertheless, in light of the cost paradox, it is intuitive that the intuitive ndings of part (c) need
not hold for su¢ciently convex inverse demand functions, as is conmed via an example below. In
light of this discussion, it emerges that ruling out the cost paradox and its plausible implications is
one of the most restrictive requirements of the present setting. All in all, Assumption C3 is then
clearly appropriate here since it guarantees both the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium
(with constant unit costs) and the abscence of the cost paradox.20
As an instructive illustration, we provide a class of convex (hyperbolic) demand functions that
violates C3.
Example. Consider a duopoly industry with an iso-elastic inverse demand function, P (Q) =
Q 1=b, 12 < b < 1, which clearly fails assumption C3. The prot functions are i(qi; qj) = [(qi +
qj)
 1=b   ci]qi. The equilibrium outputs and prots are, with i; j 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= j;
qi =
(2b  1)b
bb(ci + cj)b+1
[ci(1  b) + cjb] and 

i (ci; cj) =
(2b  1)b 1
bb
[ci(1  b) + cjb]
2
(ci + cj)b+1
:
It is easily veried that, in violation of our basic assumptions A2 - A5,
(i)
@i (ci;cj)
@ci
> 0 for some values of the parameters. In particular
@i (ci;cj)
@ci
jc1=c2> 0 if
1
2 < b <
3
5 :
(ii)
@i (ci;cj)
@cj
< 0 for some values of the parameters.
(iii) In the n-rm symmetric version of this example, @

@c > 0 (see Kimmel, 1992, and Février
and Linnemer, 2004).
Note that the above counter-intuitive results pertain to the unique interior Cournot equilibrium.
Indeed, this example gives rise to two Cournot equilibria, one of which has each rm producing zero
output.
As illustrated by this simple example, an insightful perspective on Proposition 7 is that, by
imposing one of the commonly used conditions to guarantee existence of Cournot equilibrium via the
property of strategic substitutes (Novshek, 1985 and Amir, 1996), namely C3, one also obtains as a
byproduct that the counter-intuitive results on the e¤ects of uniform or unilateral cost increases (or
uniform or individual taxation) on rms prots do not hold.
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions C1-C3, Condition (7) is veried.
Proof. See Appendix.
As can easily be seen in the proof, this result actually only requires that total equilibrium output
decreases with a unilateral unit cost increase, which holds universally in Cournot competition with
linear costs. Note also that this result provides a lower bound on the e¤ect of a unilateral cost
increase on industry prots, an issue not considered in the related literature.
20 Interestingly, while the alternative condition given in Amir (1996)  that inverse demand be log-concave  is
su¢cient for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, we were unable to prove that it guarantees the absence of the
cost paradox.
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Thus, we can conclude that under the general assumptions C1-C3, the holder of a weak patent
nds it optimal to license it out using a per-unit royalty licensing contract. This result holds whether
the patent holder is active in the (downstream) market or not.
6.2 Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products
Consider an industry consisting of n single-product rms, with constant unit costs c1; c2; :::; cn: As-
sume that the goods are imperfect substitutes. Denoting Di(p1; p2; :::; pn) the demand for the good
produced by rm i; its prot function and reaction correspondence are dened as usual by
i(pi; p i) = (pi   ci)Di(pi; p i) and ri(p i) = argmax
pi
i(pi; p i):
We will say that the Bertrand oligopoly is symmetric if the demand functions are symmetric and
c1 = c2 = ::: = cn , c:
Let Si ,

(p1; p2; :::; pn) 2 R
n
+ j Di(p1; p2; :::; pn) > 0
	
. We assume throughout that for every rm
i:
B1 Di is twice continuously di¤erentiable on Si.
B2 (i)@Di@pi < 0, (ii)
@Di
@pj
> 0 and (iii)
Pn
k=1
@Di(p;p;:::;p)
@pk
< 0 over the set Si.
B3 Di
@2 logDi
@pj@pi
  @ logDi@pj
@ logDi
@pi
> 0 over the set Si, for j 6= i.
B4
Pn
j=1
@2Di(p1;p2;:::;pn)
@pi@pj
< 0 over the set Si.
These conditions are quite general, and are commonly invoked for di¤erentiated-good demand
systems. They have the following meanings and economic interpretations. For B2, part (i) is just
the ordinary law of demand; part (ii) says that goods i and j are substitutes; and part (iii) is
a dominant diagonal condition for the Jacobian of the demand system, which is required to hold
only at equal prices (see e.g., Vives, 1999). It says that, along the diagonal, own price e¤ect on
demand exceeds the total cross-price e¤ects. B3 says that each demand has (di¤erentiably) strict
log-increasing di¤erences in own price and any rivals price. The exact economic interpretation is
that the price elasticity of demand strictly increases in any rivals price, which is a very natural
assumption (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). B4 says that the Hessian of the demand system has a
dominant diagonal, which is a standard assumption invoked to guarantee uniqueness of Bertrand
equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 or Vives, 1999). B2(iii) and B4 hold that own e¤ects of
price changes dominate cross e¤ects, for the level and the slope of demand, respectively.
The following proposition provides su¢cient conditions for Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-A5
to hold in this framework.
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions B1-B4,
(a) The Bertrand game is of strict strategic complements, and has a unique Bertrand equilibrium.
(b) Firm is equilibrium price pi is increasing in cj for any j:
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(c) Firm is equilibrium prot i is di¤erentiable in ci and cj for any j 6= i:
(d) Firm is equilibrium prot i is increasing in cj for any j 6= i:
In addition, if the game is symmetric, then
(e) the unique Bertrand equilibrium is symmetric.
(f) the equilibrium price increases in c:
(g) per-rm equilibrium prot i is di¤erentiable in c, and decreasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix.
We leave to the reader the task of matching the di¤erent parts of Proposition 9 to Assumptions
A1-A5 and A1-A5, as this step is quite similar to the Cournot case. Note here that in order to t
Assumptions A1-A5 and A1-A5, one needs to assume a symmetric form of product di¤erentiation,
as is often done in the literature.
Anderson, DePalma and Kreider (2001) extends the analysis of the e¤ects of taxation to Bertrand
competition with di¤erentiated products, and report analogous ndings as in the Cournot case. Since
Proposition 9 contains only intuitive results on the e¤ects of cost changes on prots, one concludes
that the standard assumptions for existence and uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium preclude any
counter-intuitive e¤ects of exogenous cost increases.
Proposition 10 Under Assumptions B1-B4, Condition (7) is veried.
Proof. See Appendix.
As can be seen from the proof, this result only requires that each rms equilibrium price increases
with a unilateral unit cost increase, which holds in Bertrand oligopoly with linear costs whenever
the game is supermodular (i.e, B3 holds). This result also provides a lower bound on the e¤ect of a
unilateral cost increase on industry prots, an issue not considered in the related literature.
We can then conclude that under the general assumptions B1-B4, the holder of a weak patent
prefers to license it out using a per-unit royalty licensing contract, both for the cases of an industry
insider and outsider.
7 Uncertain patents of any strength
Our analysis has focused so far on "su¢ciently weak" patents. One might wonder how weak patents
need to be for our results to hold and, relatedly, whether there exists a critical value of patent
strength below (above) which a patent holder nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty (xed fee)
contract. To provide insights into these issues, we investigate in what follows the optimal licensing
mechanism for uncertain patents of any strength  2 ]0; 1[ considering in turn (i) a setting with the
general form of competition described in Section 2 and "su¢ciently small" innovations, (ii) a setting
where the competition between the potential licensees is intense, and (iii) a linear Cournot oligopoly
with homogeneous products.
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7.1 Licensing uncertain patents covering small innovations
In this subsection we consider the general setting described in Section 2 and characterize the optimal
mechanism for the licensing of small innovations21 for any value of the patent strength, as long as
deterring litigation is optimal. For the sake of simplicity we will assume that the litigation deterrence
constraint is binding for the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation, for any  2 ]0; 1[
(this has been shown to hold for su¢ciently low values of  in Proposition 3). In others words, when
using a royalty contract, the licensor nds it optimal to ask for the maximum per-unit royalty r()
that deters litigation.22
Proposition 11 (i) If @
e
@c (n; c) + q
e(n; c)  @
i
@c (n  1; c), then for any  2 ]0; 1[, there exists ~F > 0
such that for any F 2 ]0;~F[ the patent holder prefers to o¤er a per-unit royalty contract.
(ii) If 0 < @
e
@c (n; c) + q
e(n; c) < @
i
@c (n   1; c), then, denoting
~ =
@e
@c
(n;c)+qe(n;c)
@i
@c
(n 1;c)
, we have the
following:
- If  2
i
0; ~
h
then there exists ~F > 0 such that for any F 2 ]0;~F[ the patent holder prefers to
o¤er a per-unit royalty contract.
- If  2
i
~; 1
h
then there exists F^ > 0 such that for any F 2 ]0; F^[ the patent holder prefers to
o¤er a xed fee contract.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that the strategic e¤ect of an increase in all the licensees marginal cost
on their prots, i.e. @
e
@c (n; c) + q
e(n; c), is still driving the choice of the licensing mechanism when
we extend the analysis to patents of any strength covering small innovations.23 However, in contrast
to the analysis focusing on su¢ciently weak patents, what matters now is the magnitude of this
strategic e¤ect and not merely its sign.24 If that magnitude is su¢ciently large, in the sense that
@e
@c (n; c) + q
e(n; c)  @
i
@c (n   1; c), then the per-unit royalty mechanism is preferred over the xed
fee mechanism whatever the patents strength (as long as deterring litigation is optimal to the patent
holder). However, if it is moderate, in the sense that @
e
@c (n; c) + q
e(n; c) < @
i
@c (n   1; c), then the
optimal licensing scheme depends on the patents strength: there exists a threshold ~, which is
increasing in the magnitude of the strategic e¤ect, such that patents whose strength is lower than ~
are licensed by means of per-unit royalties while those whose strength is higher than ~ are licensed
21Many empirical studies conclude that the distribution of patent values is highly rightward-skewed (see e.g. Lanjouw
et al., 1996) which suggests that the majority of innovations are indeed "small".
22Note that under the usual setting of Cournot competition with homegeneous products and linear demand, this
holds whenever the innovation size is not too large, which is consistent with our focus on small innovations in this
subsection.
23As we have already established that this strategic e¤ect is positive in the standard oligopoly models with broad
generality (see Section 6), we excluded from the proposition the (very unlikely) scenario where this e¤ect would be
negative. Note however that it is straightforward to include it.
24More precisely, what matters is the relative magnitude of this strategic e¤ect with respect to the marginal loss a
rm would incur if all its rivals marginal costs uniformly fall, i.e. the ratio
@e
@c
(n;c)+qe(n;c)
@i
@c
(n 1;c)
:
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by means of xed fees. Therefore, the lower the patents strength the higher the propensity to use
per-unit royalties. Moreover, the lower the magnitude of the identied strategic e¤ect, the more
likely the holder of an uncertain patent will license it using a per-unit royalty contract.
7.2 Licensing uncertain patents when competition is intense
In this subsection, we show that the licensor of an uncertain patent will nd it optimal to use a
per-unit royalty contract whenever competition between the potential licensees is intense enough
to drive an unsucessful challenger out of the market, and a global condition on the strategic e¤ect
of a cost variation on equilibrium prots holds. We then esatblish that the latter condition, while
being more restrictive than Condition (3), is satised under Cournot competition with homogeneous
products and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products under the same general conditions
considered in Section 6, whenever the innovation size is not too large in a sense that we specify.
We consider again the general setting described in Section 2 and assume that the litigation
deterrence constraint is binding for the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation, for any
 2 ]0; 1[. It follows from Section 4 that:
~Pr ()  ~PF () = n [r () q
e(n; c  F+ r ())  e (n; c  F) + e(n; c  F+ r ())] (8)
 n

i(n  1; c  F+ r ())  i (n  1; c  F)

:
The rst term between brackets is positive if the following condition, which is a global version of the
local Condition (3), holds :
e(n; c0)  e(n; c) >  (c0   c)qe(n; c0) for any c; c0 2 [c  F; c] such that c < c0. (9)
In what follows we argue that the second term between brackets in (8) is zero if competition is in-
tense enough, which will ensure that the per-unit royalty scheme is optimal from the patent holders
perspective whenever the competitive environment is such that Condition (9) is met. For this pur-
pose, let us denote D 2 [0; 1[ a measure of competition intensity satisfying the following natural
assumptions:
(i) For any D 2 [0; 1[ there exists a threshold ~c (D) < c such that i(n  1; c) > 0() c > ~c (D),
(ii) ~c (D) is (weakly) increasing in D and ~c (D)! c as D ! 1.
Denote D 2 [0; 1[ the level of competition intensity such that i(n   1; c   F) = 0 if and only if
D  D (F). For any D  D, let  (D) be the unique value of  such that c   F + r () = ~c (D). Then,
from (i) it follows that for any  2

0;  (D)

, it holds that i(n  1; c  F+ r ()) = 0 and, a fortiori,
i(n  1; c  F) = 0. Moreover, using (ii) we get that  (D) is increasing in D and  (D)! 1 as D ! 1.
We can therefore state the following:
Proposition 12 If Condition (9) holds then there exists a level of competition intensity D < 1 and
a threshold  (D) increasing in D such that, for any D 2 [D; 1[, the licensor of a patent of strength
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 2

0;  (D)

prefers to use a per-unit royalty contract. Moreover  (D)! 1 as D ! 1:
Alternatively, this proposition can be formulated as follows: If Condition (9) is satised, then for
any patent strength value  2 [0; 1[ the licensor will nd it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract
if the intensity of competition D is above some threshold ~D () which is increasing in  and goes to
1 when  goes to 1. It is therefore crucial to assess the generality of Condition (9). Note rst that
it implies the local Condition (3) (while the converse does not hold) and that the interpretations
for the two conditions are very close. Rewritting (9) as e(n; c)  e(n; c0) < (c0   c)qe(n; c0) for any
c; c0 2 [c  F; c] such that c < c0 shows that it means the following: the strategic e¤ect of a decrease
in the common marginal cost (from c0 to c) on prots is negative.25
In the next proposition we provide su¢cient conditions of a general nature for Condition (9)
to hold under Cournot competition with homogeneous products and Bertrand competition with
(symmetrically) di¤erentiated products.
Proposition 13 (i) Consider the Cournot setting with homogeneous products described in Section
6.1 and assume that assumptions C1-C3 hold. Denote Qe(n; c) the industry equilibrium output
when all rms produce at marginal cost c and Qm(c) the monopoly output with marginal cost c:Then
Condition (9) holds whenever Qm(c  F)  Qe(n; c).
(ii) Consider the symmetric version of the Bertrand setting described in Section 6.2 and assume
that assumptions B1-B4 hold. Denote pe(n; c) the equilibrium price when all rms produce at mar-
ginal cost c and pm(c) the (multi-product) monopoly price with marginal cost c for all products:Then
Condition (9) holds whenever pe(n; c)  pm(c  F).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the Cournot setting, it can be easily shown that Qm(c) < Qe(n; c) and that the monopoly
output Qm(c) is decreasing in c, which allows to interpret the condition Qm(c   F)  Qe(n; c) as F
being not too large. To get a sense of how restrictive this condition is, consider the special case of
a linear inverse demand p = a   Q. Then Qm(c   F)  Qe(n; c) if and only if F  n 1n+1 (a  c). To
see why this condition is not very restrictive, note that in this particular setting an innovation is
drastic if F  (a  c) : Considering now the Bertrand setting, it is straighforward that the condition
pe(n; c)  pm(c   F) may also be interpreted as F being not too large (for a given level of product
di¤erentiation). Alternatively, it could be interpreted as product di¤erentiation being su¢ciently low
(for a given innovation size F).
25Note that Condition (3) could also be interpreted in this way as the strategic e¤ect of a local decrease in marginal
costs   @
e
@c
(n; c) + qe (n; c) is exactly the opposite of the strategic e¤ect of an increase in marginal cost. However, this
does not hold when we consider global conditions such that (9): the strategic e¤ect of an increase in marginal costs
(from c to c0) is e(n; c0) + (c0   c)qe(n; c)  e(n; c) while the strategic e¤ect of a decrease in marginal costs (from c0
to c) is e(n; c)  (c0   c)qe(n; c)  e(n; c0):
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7.3 Licensing uncertain patents to Cournot competitors
In this subsection, we consider the special case of Cournot competition with linear demand p = a Q
and o¤er a complete characterization of the comparison between per-unit royalties and xed fees for
probabilistic patents of any strength covering innovations such that F  a c2(n 1) . The latter condition
implies in particular that i(n   1; c   F) > 0, i.e. that a challenger would always remain active
should the patent be upheld26 (in constrast to the scenario we focused on in Subsection 7.2). We rst
establish that there is a unique threshold patent strength below which per-unit royalties dominate and
above which xed fees are preferred, and then show that this threshold patent strength is signicantly
high for a large set of parameters. This will complement our nding in Subsection 7.2. by proving
that even in settings where competition is su¢ciently moderate to allow an unsucessful challenger
to remain active, the range of patent strength values for which the per-unit royalty mechanism is
preferred by the licensor can be substantially wide.
Standard computations show that the relevant equilibrium prots for the case we consider here
are given by
e(n; c F+r) =
(a  c+ F  r)2
(n+ 1)2
; e(n; c F) =
(a  c+ F)2
(n+ 1)2
; i(n 1; c F+r) =
[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]2
(n+ 1)2
:
The optimal per-unit royalty r() is the unique positive solution in r to the equation
(a  c+ F  r)2 = [a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]2 + (1  )(a  c+ F)2: (10)
Solving (10) yields
r() = F 
r
(a  c)2 [1 + (n  1)]2 + F (1  ) [2 (a  c) + F]
h
1   (n  1)2
i
  (a  c) [1 +  (n  1)]
1   (n  1)2
:
The licensing revenue generated by the optimal per unit royalty contract is given by:
Pr() =
n
n+ 1
r()[a  c+ F  r()]:
The optimal xed fee F () is:
F () = [e(n; c  F)  i(n  1; c  F)] = 
nF[2(a  c) + F(2  n)]
(n+ 1)2
:
26A weaker condition, i.e. F < a c
n 1
, is actually su¢cient to ensure that i(n  1; c  F) > 0:
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and, therefore, the licensing revenue generated by the optimal xed fee contract is :
PF () = nF () = n
2F
[2(a  c) + F(2  n)]
(n+ 1)2
:
The following proposition fully characterizes the patent holders optimal licensing mechanism
(under the constraint of litigation deterrence) for all patent strength values  2 ]0; 1[ :
Proposition 14 There exists a unique threshold ^ 2 ]0; 1[ such that Pr() R PF () if and only if
 S ^:
Proof. See Appendix.
It remains only to complement this result with some insight on the possible values of the threshold
patent strength ^ that can arise in plausible specications of the linear Cournot model and the
innovation parameters. In this setting it is easy to see that the parameters a, c and F a¤ect the
comparison of Pr() and PF () only through the ratio
a c
F : Taking account of the condition F 
a c
2(n 1) ,
we compute ^ for the set of the 1000 pairs
 
n; a cF

such that n = 2; 3; :::; 11 and a cF = 2(n  1) + i
where i = 1; 2; :::; 100 and nd values that are all greater than 0:5. More precisely, all the values
of ^ are found to be within the interval [0:501; 0:678] : This shows that, even when competition is
su¢ciently moderate to allow an unsuccessful challenger to remain active, the superiority of the
per-unit royalty mechanism is not a phenomenon that arises only for very small values of .
8 Welfare implications
Denote W (k; c) the social welfare, dened as the sum of aggregate prots (including the patent
holders) and consumers surplus, when k  n out of the n downstream rms produce at marginal
cost c  c, and the remaining n   k rms produce at marginal cost c. Assume that W (k; c) is
increasing in the number k of e¢cient rms and decreasing in those rms marginal cost c. This is
a very natural assumption, which holds for instance in the usual settings of Cournot oligopoly and
symmetrically di¤erentiated Bertrand oligopoly, both with linear demands.
The literature on ironclad patents shows that the holders of such patents may have incentives to
restrict the number of licensees when using xed fee contracts while they nd it optimal to license
all rms if they use per-unit royalty contracts (see e.g. Kamien, 1992): it may hold that kr = n and
kF < n where k

r (resp. k

F ) denotes the number of licensees under the patent holders optimal per-
unit royalty (resp. xed fee) contract. In such a context, a trade-o¤ between the number of licensees
and their e¢ciency exists: it is a priori unclear whether welfare when licensing is made through a
per-unit royalty contract, i.e. W (n; c  F+ r) where r > 0 is the optimal per-unit royalty from the
patent holders perspective, is higher or lower than social welfare when a xed fee contract is used,
i.e. W (kF ; c  F). Such ambiguity does not exist in our setting: whenever the patent holder nds it
optimal to deter litigation, all rms have to be licensed. Therefore, the use of a contract involving the
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payment of per-unit royalty r > 0 results in a social welfareW (n; c F+r), while the use of a xed fee
contract yields a social welfareW (n; c F): It then follows from r > 0 thatW (n; c F+r) < W (n; c F),
which means that the xed fee scheme is socially superior to the per-unit royalty scheme (and to
any two-part tari¤ mechanism involving the payment of a positive per-unit royalty). Thus, whenever
the patent holder prefers to o¤er a per-unit royalty contract, which is the case in particular for
weak patents, the privately optimal licensing scheme will be socially suboptimal. This highlights a
particular channel through which uncertainty over patent validity can be detrimental to society.
9 Conclusion
The issue of patent quality is one of the most serious problems facing the patent system. Mark Lemley
who was arguing some time ago against increasing the resources allocated to the Patent O¢ce in
order to improve the examination of patent applications (Lemley, 2001) is now much more concerned
about this issue: "Some bad quality patents award legal rights that are far broader than what their
relevant inventors actually invented, and they do so with respect to technologies that turn out to be
economically signicant. Many Internet patents fall into this category. Rarely a month goes by that
some unknown patent holder does not surface and claim to be the true inventor of eBay or the rst
to come up with now-familiar concepts like hyperlinking and e-commerce. While some such Internet
patents may be validsomeone did invent those things, after allmore often the people asserting the
patents actually invented something much more modest. But they persuaded the Patent O¢ce to give
them rights that are broader than what they actually invented, imposing an implicit tax on consumers
and thwarting truly innovative companies who do or would pioneer those elds" (Lemley, 2012).
One negative consequence of the issuance of weak patents on social welfare stems from the legal
costs of patent dispute resolution in court. The use of licensing agreements to deter or settle patent
litigation allows to avoid those direct costs but induces another indirect loss in welfare, in particular
due to the use of a licensing mechanism which is potentially suboptimal from a social standpoint.
We therefore argue that it is important to get a better understanding of the contracts used for the
licensing of technologies covered by dubious patents. In this paper we provide a su¢cient condition
under which the holder of a weak patent prefers to license its technology through a per-unit royalty
contract rather than a xed fee contract and show that this condition is very mild: it holds under
general conditions for a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods and a Bertrand oligopoly with
heterogeneous goods, regardless of whether the patent holder is an outsider or an insider to the
industry. A signicant di¤erence with respect to the literature on the licensing of ironclad patents is
that we get a clear-cut result on the comparison of a patent holders prots under the two schemes,
independently of the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation between products
and whether the patent holder is active or not in the downstream market, while varying any of these
three features can overturn the outcome of the comparison when ironclad patents are considered.
Furthermore, it is shown that society is always harmed by the patent holders choice of a per-unit
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royalty contract in our setting. Our analysis therefore suggests that constraining or encouraging the
licensors of questionable patents to use xed-fee contracts may yield welfare gains.
Finally, our model generates some testable predictions that might be worth investigating: First,
our results suggest that per-unit royalty licenses should be more prevalent in industries with a
signicant proportion of rms holding questionable patents, e.g., industries relying on some new
patentable subject matter (biotechnology, software, business methods,...). Second, if the predictions
of our model are correct then under the presumption that the EPO is more stringent in checking the
patentability standards than the USPTO, the use of per-unit royalties should be less prevalent in the
EU than in the US.
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11 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
All rms accepting the license o¤er is an equilibrium if and only if:
e(n; c  F+ r)  i(n  1; c  F+ r) + (1  )e(n; c  F)
which can be rewritten as:
g (r; )  e(n; c  F+ r)  i(n  1; c  F+ r)  (1  )e(n; c  F)  0:
29
We have g (0; ) = 

e(n; c  F)  i(n  1; c  F)

 

e(n; c)  i(n  1; c  F)

 

i(n  1; c)  i(n  1; c  F)

> 0 (by A2 and A5) and g (F; ) = e(n; c)   i(n   1; c)  
(1  )e(n; c   F) = (1  ) (e(n; c)  e(n; c  F)) < 0 (by A2): Combining this with g being
continuous (by A1) and strictly decreasing in r (by A3) yields: i/ the existence and uniqueness of
a solution in r to the equation g (r; ) = 0 (within the interval [0; F[), which we denote by r () ; ii/
the equivalence between te inequalities g (r; )  0 and r  r () :
Proof of Proposition 2
We have already shown (in the main text ) that all rms deciding to purchase a license at a xed fee
F is an equilibrium of the second stage subgame if and only if:
F  F () , 

e(n; c  F)  i(n  1; c  F)

:
All rms but one deciding to purchase a license is an equilibrium of the second stage subgame if the
following two conditions hold:
i(n  1; c  F) + (1  )e(n; c  F)  e(n; c  F)  F
and
 [e(n  1; c  F)  F ] + (1  )e(n; c  F)  i(n  2; c  F) + (1  )e(n; c  F):
Thus, all rms but one deciding to purchase a license is an equilibrium if and only if:
F ()  F  Fn 1 , e(n  1; c  F)  i(n  2; c  F):
Denoting Fk , e(k; c  F)  i(k   1; c  F) for each k = 1; 2; ::; n, we can further show that for any
k = 1; 2; :::; n  2, a number k of rms accepting the license o¤er and the other n  k rms not doing
so is an equilibrium if and only if:
Fk+1  F  Fk:
Moreover, all rms deciding not to buy a license is an equilibrium if and only if:
F  F1:
If we assume that the sequence (Fk)1kn is decreasing, i.e. a rms willingness to pay for a license
(under ironclad patent protection) decreases with the number of licensees, and that a rm which is
indi¤erent between accepting and refusing the license o¤er buys a license, then for any F  0, there
is a unique equilibrium to the second stage subgame up to a permutation of rms: all the equilibria
of the second stage subgame involve the same number of licensees (which allows to dene a "demand
function" for licenses which is decreasing in the xed fee F ). However, if (Fk)1kn is not decreasing
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then there might exist some values of F for which there is either no (pure-strategy) equilibrium or
multiple equilibria with di¤erent number of licensees.
However, if we focus on small values of  and do not care about whether pure-strategy equilibria exist
- and which one arises in case they do - if all rms accepting the license o¤er is not an equilibrium
(as in the present paper), then the problem of multiplicity or inexistence of equilibria depicted above
does not a¤ect our analysis. The reason is that, to be sure that all rms accepting a license is
the unique equilibrium whenever it is an equilibrium, i.e. whenever F  F (), we only need the
inequality F ()  Fk to hold for any k = 1; 2; :::; n  1, which, given that F () = Fn; is true if  is
small enough, and more specically if
   =
min
1kn 1
Fk
Fn
:
Proof of Proposition 3
All rms accepting the payment of a per-unit royalty r is an equilibrium if and only if r  r () :
Furthermore, A1 ensures that the licensing revenue function r ! nrqe (n; c  F+ r) is strictly in-
creasing in the neighborhood of 0 (its derivative at r = 0 being qe (n; c  F) > 0). Since r () is
continuous (by the Implicit Function Theorem) and increasing and r (0) = 0; we can conclude that,
for  su¢ciently small, the function nrqe (n; c  F+ r) is increasing over [0; r ()] and, therefore, the
optimal per-unit royalty license accepted by all rms involves the payment of the royalty rate r (),
that is, the litigation deterrence constraint is binding.
The optimal xed fee license deterring litigation maximizes the patent holders revenues nF under the
constraint F  F (). It is straightforward that solution to this constrained maximization program
is F = F () :
Proof of Proposition 4
Since ~Pr (0) = ~PF (0) then ~Pr () > ~PF () for  su¢ciently small if:
d ~Pr ()
d
j=0  
d ~PF ()
d
j=0> 0 (11)
which can be rewritten as:
nr0 (0) qe(n; c  F) > n

e (n; c  F)  i (n  1; c  F)

because r (0) = 0: Moreover di¤erentiating at  = 0 the equation dening r (), that is,
e (n; c  F+ r ()) = i (n  1; c  F+ r ()) + (1  )e (n; c  F)
we get:
r0 (0)
@e
@c
(n; c  F) = i (n  1; c  F)  e (n; c  F)
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which yields:
r0 (0) =
i (n  1; c  F)  e (n; c  F)
@e
@c (n; c  F)
:
Therefore, (11) is equivalent to:
n
i (n  1; c  F)  e (n; c  F)
@e
@c (n; c  F)
qe(n; c  F) > n

e (n; c  F)  i (n  1; c  F)

which can be rewritten as:
@e
@c
(n; c  F) >  qe(n; c  F)
because i (n  1; c  F)  e (n; c  F) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove that ~F () = 0 for  su¢ciently small, it is su¢cient to show that the function h(r; ) =
rqe (n; c  F+ r)+e(n; c F+r) i(n 1; c F+r) (1  )e(n; c F) is increasing for su¢ciently
small values of r and  (this follows immediately from r (0) = 0 and r () being continuous in ). We
have:
@h
@r
(0; ) = qe (n; c  F) +
@e
@c
(n; c  F)  
@i
@c
(n  1; c  F):
Let us now assume that @
e
@c (n; c  F) >  q
e (n; c  F). We need to distinguish between two cases:
- Case 1: @
i
@c (n  1; c  F) = 0 : in this
@h
@r (0; ) =
@h
@r (0; 0) > 0 for any  2 [0; 1]
- Case 2: @
i
@c (n 1; c F) 6= 0: in this case
@h
@r (0; ) > 0 for any  2

0;min

1;
qe(n;c F)+ @
e
@c
(n;c F)
@i
@c
(n 1;c F)

.
Therefore, in both cases, @h@r (0; ) > 0 for su¢ciently small values of . Using the continuity of
r ! @h@r (r; ), we can then state that
@h
@r (r; ) > 0 for su¢ciently small values of r and , which, as
claimed before, is su¢cient to complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6
Under the per-unit royalty mechanism, the optimal royalty rI () for su¢ciently weak patents is the
solution in r to the following equation:
l(n  1; c  F+ r) = n(n  2; c  F+ r) + (1  )l(n  1; c  F)
and the patent holders overall prot is
~r () = 
p(n  1; c  F+ rI()) + (n  1) rI()q
l(n  1; c  F+ rI()):
Under the xed fee mechanism, the optimal fee is given by
FI () = 
h
l(n  1; c  F)  n(n  2; c  F)
i
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and the patent holders overall prot is then
~F () = 
p(n  1; c  F) + (n  1) 
h
l (n  1; c  F)  n (n  2; c  F)
i
:
Since ~r (0) = ~F (0) then ~r () > ~F () for  su¢ciently small if
d~r ()
d
j=0>
d~F ()
d
j=0 (12)
which can be rewritten as
r0I(0)

@p
@c
(n  1; c  F) + (n  1) ql(n; c  F)

> (n  1)
h
l (n  1; c  F)  n (n  2; c  F)
i
:
because rI(0) = 0: Moreover, di¤erentiating at  = 0 the equation dening rI(), we get
r0I(0):
@l
@c
(n  1; c  F) = n (n  2; c  F)  l (n  1; c  F)
which yields
r0I(0) =
n (n  2; c  F)  l (n  1; c  F)
@l
@c (n  1; c  F)
:
Hence, inequality (12) is equivalent to
n(n 2;c F) l(n 1;c F)
@l
@c
(n 1;c F)

@p
@c (n  1; c  F) + (n  1) q
l(n; c  F)

> (n  1)

e (n  1; c  F)  i (n  2; c  F)

which can be rewritten as
@p
@c
(n  1; c  F) + (n  1) ql(n; c  F) >   (n  1)
@l
@c
(n  1; c  F)
or, equivalently, as
@p
@c
(n  1; c  F) + (n  1)
@l
@c
(n  1; c  F) >   (n  1) ql(n; c  F):
Proof of Proposition 7
(a) This follows from the key slope property that every selection of ri satises (see Amir, 1996,
and Amir and Lambson, 2000 for details)
 1 <
ri(Q
0
 i)  ri(Q i)
Q0 i  Q i
< 0 for all Q0 i > Q i: (13)
(b) We rst show that qi is continuously di¤erentiable in ci: Viewed as a correspondence in the
parameter ci, q

i is upper hemi-continuous (or u.h.c.), as a direct consequence of the well-known
property of u.h.c. of the equilibrium correspondence for games with continuous payo¤ functions
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(jointly in own and rivals actions), see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990. Since qi is also single-
valued in c (from part (b)), qi must be a continuous function. Then the fact that q

i is continuously
di¤erentiable in ci follows from the Implicit Function Theorem applied to the rst order conditions,
and the smoothness of P ().
The fact that i is also continuously di¤erentiable in ci follows directly from the fact that q

i has
that same property for all i.
The proof for the parameter cj ; j 6= i; follows along the same lines.
(c) Throughout part (c), x i and denote rm is output, prot and its rivals total outputs at
equilibrium by qi ; 

i and Q

 i respectively when the cost vector is (c1; c2; :::; cn). Denote the same
three variables by bqi; bi and bQ i after rm is cost alone changes to bci > ci, all other rms unit costs
remaining the same.
Adding the n rst order conditions at the Cournot equilibrium yields
nP (Q) +QP 0 (Q) =
nX
k=1
ck: (14)
Since the LHS of (14) is strictly decreasing in Q, the increase in rm is cost from ci to bci increases
the RHS of (14), which causes the solution to (14) to decrease. In other words, bQ < Q.
We now show that for any rm j 6= i, we must have bQ j < Q j . To this end, rst observe thatbQ j + rj( bQ j) = bQ < Q = Q j + rj(Q j). Since (13) holds that Q j + rj(Q j) is increasing in
Q j , we must have bQ j < Q j .
For rm j,
bj = bqj hP (bqj + bQ j)  cji
 qj
h
P (qj + bQ j)  cji by the Cournot property
> qj

P (qj +Q

 j)  cj

since bQ j < Q j
= j :
We now show that for rm i, we must have bQ i > Q i. To this end, rst observe that since for
any j 6= i, rj is strictly decreasing (cf. (13)) and bQ j < Q j , we have bqj = rj( bQ j) > rj(Q j) = qj ,
for every rm j 6= i. Then since bQ i =Pj 6=i bqj and Q i =Pj 6=i qj , we have bQ i > Q i.
To show that i > bi, consider
i = q

i

P (qi +Q

 i)  ci

 bqi P (bqi +Q i)  ci by the Cournot property
> bqi[P (bqi + bQ i)  ci] since bQ i > Q i:
> bqi[P (bqi + bQ i)  bci] since bci > ci
= bi:
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For the remaining parts, we consider the case of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly (ci = c for all i).
(d) Due to the symmetry of the game, asymmetric equilibria, if any, would come in n-tuples.
Hence, the conclusion follows from part (a) directly.
(e) Let q denote each rms equilibrium output. Di¤erentiating the rst order condition with
respect to c; we get:
@q
@c

(n+ 1)P 0 (nq) + nqP" (nq)

= 1: (15)
Using the rst order condition and C3, it is easy to see that the term in brackets is strictly negative,
it follows that @q

@c < 0.
We now show that per-rm prot decreases in c. Denote the equilibrium variables by qi ; 

i and
Q i when the unit cost is c, and by q
0
i; 
0
i and Q
0
 i the same variables when the unit cost is c
0 > c:
Di¤erentiating i = q
 [P (nq)  c] with respect to c yields
@i
@c
=
@q
@c
[P (nq)  c] + q

P 0(nq)n
@q
@c
  1

(16)
=
@q
@c
(n+ 1)qP 0(nq)  q by (14)
=  q
2P 0(Q) +QP" (Q)
(n+ 1)P 0 (Q) +QP" (Q)
by (15).
Clearly, C3 implies that 2P 0(Q) +QP" (Q) < 0 for all Q, so the numerator in the above fraction is
< 0. It is then easy to see that the denominator is also < 0. Hence
@i
@c < 0:
Proof of Proposition 8
Let us show that Condition (7) holds (which will imply that both Condition (5) and Condition
(6) are satised).
Total di¤erentiation w.r.t. ci in
 = (P (Q)  ci) q

i +
X
j 6=i
(P (Q)  cj) q

j
yields
@
@ci
= [P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
  1]qi + (P (Q
)  ci)
@qi
@ci
+
X
j 6=i
[P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  cj)
@qj
@ci
]:
which can be rewritten as:
@
@ci
=  qi +
X
j

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  cj)
@qj
@ci

:
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When ci = cj = c, the latter becomes:
@
@ci
=  qi +
X
j

P 0(Q)
@Q
@ci
qj + (P (Q
)  c)
@qj
@ci

=  qi + P
0(Q)
@Q
@ci
X
j
qj + (P (Q
)  c)
X
j
@qj
@ci
=  qi + P
0(Q)
@Q
@ci
:Q + (P (Q)  c)
@Q
@ci
=  qi|{z}
direct e¤ect
+
@Q
@ci

P 0(Q):Q + (P (Q)  c)

| {z }
strategic e¤ect
:
Adding the n rst order conditions at the Cournot equilibrium yields
nP (Q) +QP 0 (Q) =
nX
k=1
ck = nc:
Thus,
QP 0(Q) + (P (Q)  c) =
n  1
n
QP 0(Q) < 0:
Moreover, since we have already shown (in the proof of Proposition 6) that @Q

@ci
< 0,
@Q
@ci

P 0(Q):Q + (P (Q)  c)

> 0
which yields:
@
@ci
>  qi :
Proof of Proposition 9
First note that for rm i, charging a price of ci strictly dominates charging any price below ci.
Hence, we restrict attention to the price space [ci;1) as the action set for rm i; i = 1; 2; :::; n. Then
the transfomed prot function log i(pi; p i) is well dened.
(a) For the proof that the game with log prots as payo¤s is of strict strategic complements,
observe that, due to B3, each payo¤ i(pi; p i) satises @
2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@p i > 0. Hence, by
the strong version of Topkiss Theorem (see Amir, 1996 or Topkis, 1998 p. 79), every selection of
ri(p i) is strictly increasing in p i. It follows directly from the property of strategic complements, via
Tarskis xed point theorem, that the Bertrand equilibrium set is nonempty. Uniqueness then follows
from a well known argument from B4 (for details, see Milgrom and Roberts 1990, pp. 1271-1272, or
Vives, 1999 pp. 149-150).
(b) To show that the equilibrium price pi is increasing in ci, note that the price game is log-
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supermodular (from part (a)), log i(pi; p i) = log(pi   ci) + logDi(pi; p i) has the increasing dif-
ferences property in (pi; ci) since @
2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@ci = (pi   ci)
 2 > 0, and the constraint set
[ci;1) is clearly ascending in ci. So the conclusion follows from Theorem 7 in Milgrom and Roberts
(1990).
The fact that the equilibrium price pi is also increasing in cj for any j 6= i, follows from a similar
argument since @2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@cj = 0.
(c) We rst show that every equilibrium price pi is continuously di¤erentiable in cj , for all i
and j: Viewed as a correspondence in the parameter cj , p

i is u.h.c., by the u.h.c. property of the
equilibrium correspondence for games with continuous payo¤ functions (jointly in own and rivals
actions), see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990. Since pi is also single-valued in cj (from part (i)),
pi is a continuous function. Then the fact that p

i is continuously di¤erentiable in cj follows from
the Implicit Function Theorem. Finally, continuous di¤erentiability of i follows from that of all the
p0i s.
(d) Di¤erentiating i = (p

i   ci)Di(p

i ; p

 i) with respect to cj , for i 6= j, yields
@i
@cj
=
@pi
@cj
Di(p

i ; p

 i) + (p

i   ci)
X
k
@Di
@pk
@pk
@cj
: (17)
Using the rst order condition Di(p

i ; p

 i) + (p

i   ci)
@Di
@pi
= 0, (17) reduces to
@i
@cj
= (pi   ci)
X
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
@pk
@cj
 0
since @Di@pk > 0 (goods are substitutes) and
@p
k
@cj
 0 from part (b).
(e) When the Bertrand game is symmetric, the unique Bertrand equilibrium must be symmetric,
for otherwise equilibria would come in pairs.
(f) The conclusion follows from the same argument as for part (b) in view of the fact that
@2 log i(pi; p i)=@pi@c = (pi   c)
 2 > 0.
(g) From an argument similar to the proof of part (c), p and thus i = (p
   c)Di(p
; p; :::; p)
are di¤erentiable with respect to c. We now derive an expression for @p

@c : The FOC at a Bertrand
equilibrium is
Di(p
; :::; p) + (p   c)@Di(p
; :::; p)=@pi = 0: (18)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem and di¤erentiating the FOC with respect to c yields0@@Di
@pi
+
X
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
1A @p
@c
+ (pi   ci)
@p
@c
X
k
@Di
@pk@pi
+ (
@p
@c
  1)
@Di
@pi
= 0:
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Hence, using B2 and B4,
@p
@c
=
@Di=@pi
2@Di@pi +
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
> 0: (19)
We can di¤erentiate  = (p   c)Di(p
; p; :::; p) with respect to c to obtain
@
@c
= (
@p
@c
  1)Di(p
; :::; p) + (p   c)
@p
@c
X
k
@Di
@pk
= Di(p
; :::; p)
"
 1 
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
@Di=@pi
@p
@c
#
from (18)
which yields:
@
@c
= Di(p
; :::; p)
"
 1 
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
2@Di@pi +
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
#
using (19)
= Di(p
; :::; p)
"
 
2
P
k
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
2@Di@pi +
P
k 6=i
@Di
@pk
+ (pi   ci)
P
k
@Di
@pk@pi
#
< 0 by B2 and B4:
Proof of Proposition 10
Let us show that Condition (7) holds (which will imply that both Condition (5) and Condition
(6) are satised).
We have:
 = (pi   ci)D

i +
X
j 6=i
 
pj   cj

Dj
then:
@
@ci
=

@pi
@ci
  1

Di + (p

i   ci)
@Di
@ci
+
X
j 6=i

@pj
@ci
Dj + (p

i   ci)
@Dj
@ci

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which can be rewritten as:
@
@ci
=  Di +
X
j

@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@ci

=  Di +
X
j
"
@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
X
k
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
#
=  Di +
X
j
24@pj
@ci
Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@pj
:
@pj
@ci
+
 
pj   cj
X
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
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=  Di +
X
j
26664@p

j
@ci

Dj +
 
pj   cj
 @Dj
@pj

| {z }
=0
+
 
pj   cj
X
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
37775
=  Di +
X
j
24 pj   cjX
k 6=j
@Dj
@pk
:
@pk
@ci
35
We have already shown that
@p
k
@ci
> 0 for any k; i (see the proof for part (b) of Proposition 8).
Moreover, we have
@Dj
@pk
> 0 for any j 6= k (from B2(ii)). It then follows that:
@
@ci
>  Di =  q

i
This proof establishes a result which is more general than Condition (7). We have actually shown
that @

@ci
(c1; c2; :::; cn) >  q

i (c1; c2; :::; cn) for any (c1; c2; :::; cn) :
Proof of Proposition 11
In this proof we will explicit in our notations the dependence on F:Di¤erentiating with respect
to F the equation e(n; c  F+ r (; F)) = i(n  1; c  F+ r (; F)) + (1  )e(n; c  F) dening the
optimal royalty rate r (; F) deterring litigation, and taking the limit F  ! 0 we obtain:
@e
@c
(n; c)

 1 +
@r
@F
(; 0)

= 
@i
@c
(n  1; c)

 1 +
@r
@F
(; 0)

  (1  )
@e
@c
(n; c)
which yields:
@r
@F
(; 0) = 
@i
@c (n  1; c) 
@e
@c (; c)
@i
@c (n  1; c)  
@e
@c (n; c)
:
Di¤erentiating the patent holders licensing revenues Pr (; F) = nr (; F) q
e(n; c   F + r (; F)) with
39
respect to F and again taking the limit F  ! 0, we get:
@Pr
@F
(; 0) = n
@r
@F
(; 0) qe(n; c)
= nqe(n; c):
@i
@c (n  1; c) 
@e
@c (n; c)
@i
@c (n  1; c)  
@e
@c (n; c)
:
Furthermore,
@PF
@F
(; 0) = n

@i
@c
(n  1; c) 
@e
@c
(n; c)

:
Comparing@Pr@F (; 0) and
@PF
@F (; 0) yields the following result:
@Pr
@F
(; 0) >
@PF
@F
(; 0)()
@e
@c
(n; c) >  qe(n; c)+ 
@i
@c
(n  1; c)()  > ~ ,
@e
@c (n; c) + q
e(n; c)
@i
@c (n  1; c)
:
Combining this with Pr (; 0) = 0 = PF (; 0) and using the continuity of Pr (; F) and PF (; F), we
can state that for any  < ~ there exists ~F > 0 such that for any F 2 (0;~F) the patent holder prefers
to o¤er a per-unit royalty contract and for any  > ~ there exists F^ > 0 such that for any F 2 (0; F^)
the patent holder prefers to o¤er a xed fee contract. Note that the latter scenario (i.e.  > ~) can
arise for a non-empty set of values of  < 1 if and only if ~ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 13
(i) Cournot competition with homogeneous products : In that environment, the strategic e¤ect of
a decrease in the common marginal cost from c0 to c on individual prots is:
e(n; c)  e(n; c0)  (c0   c)qe(n; c0) = (P (nqe(n; c))  c)qe(n; c)  (P (nqe(n; c0)  c)qe(n; c0)
=
1
n

(P (Qe(n; c))  c)Qe(n; c)  (P (Qe(n; c0)  c)Qe(n; c0)

:
We can easily derive from C3, combined with C1, that a monopolists prot (P (Q) c)Q is concave.
Denoting Qm(c) the monopoly output with marginal cost c27, it follows that (P (Q) c)Q is decreasing
over the interval [Qm(c); Qe(n; c)].28 We know from part (e) of Proposition 7 that c < c0 implies
Qe(n; c0) < Qe(n; c). Therefore, the strategic e¤ect e(n; c)   e(n; c0)   (c0   c)qe(n; c0) is negative
if Qm(c)  Qe(n; c0). Thus, for Condition (9) to hold it is su¢cient to suppose, beside assumptions
C1-C3, that Qm(c  F)  Qe(n; c).29
27 It is straigtforward to establish the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the monopolists maximization
program under C1-C3.
28The inequality Qm(c) < Qe(n; c) follows from the fact that P 0(Q)Q + P (Q) is decreasing in Q, combined with
P 0(Qm(c))Qm(c) + P (Qm(c)) = c and P 0(Qe(n; c))Qe(n; c) + P (Qe(n; c)) = c+ n 1
n
P 0(Qe(n; c))Qe(n; c) < c:
29Under Cournot competition with a linear inverse demand P (Q) = a   Q, this condition holds whenever F 
n 1
n+1
(a  c). To see why this condition is not very restrictive, recall that in this setting an innovation is drastic if
F  (a  c) : Moreover, the condition Qm(c   F)  Qe(n; c) can be weakened to Qe(n; c   F)  Qe(n; c   F) where
Qe(n; c  F) is the unique value of Q < Qm(c  F) such that (P (Q)  c+ F)Q = (P (Qe(n; c  F))  c+ F)Qe(n; c  F).
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(ii) Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products : DenotingDi(p; p; :::; p) , D(p) and pe(n; c)
the (common) equilibrium price when the (common) marginal cost is c, we can rewrite the strategic
e¤ect of a decrease in the common marginal cost from c0 to c on individual prots as follows:
e(n; c)  e(n; c0)  (c0   c)qe(n; c0) = (pe(n; c)  c)D(pe(n; c)) 
 
pe(n; c0)  c

D(pe(n; c0):
Using B2 and B4 we can easily show that the function (p  c)D(p), which can be interpreted as the
prot that a multi-product monopolist producing the n varieties and selling them at the same price p
derives from each variety, is concave. Denoting pm(c) , argmax(p c)D(p), it follows that (p c)D(p)
is increasing over [pe(n; c); pm(c)].30 We know from part (f) of Proposition 9 that c < c0 implies
pe(n; c) < pe(n; c0). Therefore, we can state that the strategic e¤ect e(n; c) e(n; c0) (c0 c)qe(n; c0)
is negative if pe(n; c0)  pm(c). Thus, for Condition (9) to hold it is su¢cient to suppose, beside
assumptions B1-B4, that pe(n; c)  pm(c  F).
Proof of Proposition 14
Step 1: Existence of ^
We have Pr(1) =
n
n+1F(a   c) and PF (1) = n
2F [2(a c)+F(2 n)]
(n+1)2
. It is easily veried that Pr(1) <
PF (1)() (n  2) F <
n 1
n (a  c). Moreover,
n 1
n(n 2)  
1
2n 1 =
n2 n+1
n(n 2)(2n 1) > 0: Therefore, Pr(1) <
PF (1) for any F 
a c
2n 1 . This, combined with the continuity of the function  ! Pr()   PF ()
and the fact that Pr() > PF () for  > 0 su¢ciently small (which holds because the linear demand
satises C1-C3 and, therefore, Condition (7) is satised), ensures the existence of a value ^ such
that Pr() = PF ().
Step 2: Su¢cient condition for the uniqueness of ^:
Remark: This part of the proof is not specic to the linear Cournot model considered in this subsec-
tion. It holds in any competitive environment such that A1-A5 hold and @q
e
@c < 0:
To show that there is a unique ^, it is su¢cient to show that
d ~Pr ()
d
<
d ~PF ()
d
for all  2 ]0; 1[ such that ~Pr () = ~PF () : (20)
Now d
~Pr()
d <
d ~PF ()
d i¤
r0 () qe(n; c  F+ r ()) + r ()
@qe(n; c  F+ r ())
@c
< e (n; c  F)  i (n  1; c  F) :
Evaluating along ~Pr () = ~PF (), i.e. nr () q
e(n; c  F+ r ()) = n

e (n; c  F)  i (n  1; c  F)

,
(and dropping arguments) yields
r0 () qe + r ()
@qe
@c
r0 () <
r () qe

30The inequality pe(n; c) < pm(c) follows from the fact that (p  c)D0(p) + D(p) is decreasing, combined with
(pm(c)  c)D0(pm(c)) +D(pm(c)) = 0 and (pe(n; c)  c)D0(pe(n; c)) +D(pe(n; c)) = (pe(n; c)  c)
P
j 6=i
@Di
@pj
> 0.
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or 
r0 () 
r ()


qe + r ()
@qe
@c
r0 () < 0:
To have this, it is su¢cient to have (since r () @q
e
@c r
0 () < 0) that along ~Pr () = ~PF ()
r0 () 
r ()

 0
which can be rewritten as
r ()  r0 ()  0:
The function s() = r ()  r0 () is such that s(0) = 0 and s0() =  r00 () so a su¢cient condition
for s() to be non-negative over [0; 1] is that r () is weakly concave over [0; 1].
Step 3: Proof for the (weak) concavity of r ()
We have
(a  c+ F  r())2 = [a  c  (n  1)(F  r())]2 + (1  )(a  c+ F)2:
Di¤erentiating the latter w.r.t.  (and dropping the argument of r()) yields
 2(a  c+ F  r)r0() = [a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]2+2(n  1)r0()[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]  (a  c+ F)2:
Solving for r0()
r0() =  
1
2
[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]2   (a  c+ F)2
(a  c+ F  r) + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]
: (21)
Upon factorization, we have
r0() =
1
2
[nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r]
a  c+ F  r + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]
> 0: (22)
Di¤erentiating w.r.t.  once more yields
r00() =
 (n  1)r0()[2(a  c)  2(n  1)F+ 2(n  1)r]fa  c+ F  r + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g
2f(a  c+ F  r) + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g2
 
[nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r]f[(n  1)2   1]r0() + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g
2f(a  c+ F  r) + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g2
:
So r00() has the sign of
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 (n  1)r0()[2(a  c)  2(n  1)F+ 2(n  1)r]fa  c+ F  r + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g
  [nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r]f[(n  1)2   1]r0() + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g:
From r0() > 0 it follows that r00() has the sign of
 (n  1)[2(a  c)  2(n  1)F+ 2(n  1)r]fa  c+ F  r + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g
  [nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r][(n  1)2   1]
 
1
r0()
[nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r](n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g:
Using (22), we get that r00() has the sign of
 (n  1)[2(a  c)  2(n  1)F+ 2(n  1)r]fa  c+ F  r + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g
  [nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r][(n  1)2   1]
 2 fa  c+ F  r + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g:
which is the same as
 (n  1)[4(a  c)  4(n  1) (F  r)]fa  c+ F  r + (n  1)[a  c  (n  1)(F  r)]g
  [nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r][(n  1)2   1]:
Note rst that the latter expression is clearly non-positive for any   1
(n 1)2
. Moreover, a su¢cient
condition for this expression to be non-positive for any  < 1
(n 1)2
is that
4(n  1)[(a  c)  (n  1) (F  r)] [a  c+ F  r]  [nF  (n  1)r] [2(a  c)  (n  2)F+ (n  1)r]  0
for any r 2 [0; F]. From r  0 and F  0 it follows that a su¢cient condition for the latter to hold is
4(n  1)[(a  c)  (n  1) (F  r)] [a  c+ F  r]  (n  1) (F  r) [2(a  c)  (n  2) (F  r)]  0 (23)
for any r 2 [0; F]. Denoting y = F ra c , it is straightforward to show that (23) can be rewritten as
  (n  1) (3n  2)y2   (n  1) [4n  6] y + 4(n  1)  0
or, equivalently, as
(3n  2) y2 + (4n  6)y  4:
Let us show that this inequality holds, which will complete the proof. Since y  12(n 1)  1 for any
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F  a c2(n 1) and r 2 [0; F], it holds that
(3n  2) y2 + (4n  6)y  (7n  8) y 
7n  8
2 (n  1)

8(n  1)
2(n  1)
= 4:
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